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Abstract 
Purpose - The purpose of this study is to analyse the level of online disclosure of 
firms in the USA and to evaluate the impact of diversity in terms of director 
nationality (boardroom internationalisation) on online disclosure. 
Design/methodology/approach – The authors apply, for the first time, a new 
modified scoring system to measure online disclosure levels by securing more 
detailed information on each of the items in the voluntary disclosure index. 
Regarding the percentage of foreign board members, unlike in previous research, 
the authors calculate two additional proxies to more accurately specify the level 
of international diversity on the board: the Blau Index and the Shannon Index. 
Moreover, the authors use a cross-sectional model for the sampled non-financial 
S&P500 firms using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and heteroskedasticity-
corrected estimates to analyse the impact of boardroom internationalisation on 
the level of online disclosure. 
Findings - The findings reveal that the average online disclosure level for the 
sample in question is 64% for the 0–1 index and 57% for the 0–4 index. In addition, 
the results of the regression analysis confirm the study’s proposed hypothesis, 
which is that the presence of international board members correlates with an 
improvement in the level of online disclosure. This can be attributed to the fact 
that foreign directors bring unique skills and knowledge from their home 
countries and thus, increase board discussion, creativity and innovation, which 
has a positive impact on the level of online disclosure. 
Research Limitations/Implications - Financial firms are subject to capital 
requirement regulations; consequently, disclosure practices can be influenced. 
Therefore, these firms were excluded from the sample of the study. 
Originality/Value - This research contributes to the body of literature on 
nationality diversity of firm boards and corporate online disclosure in several 
respects. Firstly, the study adds an international dimension to the existing 
literature. Secondly, this study provides new evidence that foreign diversity on 
the board can improve firm value, insofar as the corresponding enhancement of 
online disclosure leading to positive capital market implications. Thirdly, the 
authors use, for the first time, a new scoring system approach to measure the 
level of online disclosure. Finally, it contributes to the corporate governance 
literature by basing its analysis on a multi-theoretical approach. 
 
Keywords Online disclosure, Foreign board member, Boardroom, Corporate 
governance, Corporate website Paper type Research paper 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of information disclosure via website is to allow investors to assess a 
firm’s current performance and evaluate its prospects to make informed financial 
decisions. Furthermore, information disclosure via websites helps improve 
investing efficiency and reduces the agency problem by mitigating information 
asymmetry between managers and investors (Aly et al., 2010). Over the past few 
decades, many sizeable economic crises and corporate collapses, which have had 
a massive impact on the global economy, have brought debate on corporate 
information disclosure to the fore. Corporate stakeholders need key relevant 
information regarding firms’ activities to assess their own financial position (Zeghal 
and El Aoun, 2016). Responding to these events, regulatory agencies have been 
obliged to reassess corporate policy basics in this regard (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). 
The present study aims to answer the following question: what is the impact of 
director nationality (boardroom internationalisation) on online disclosure? 
Dewayanto et al. (2017) suggest that this type of diversity in particular may render 
the board with a unique understanding of the strategies used in outside markets, 
which can prove useful to domestic firms, especially those who plan to expand into 
foreign markets. In addition, internationally diverse boards are thought to be more 
effective in terms of transferring corporate governance practices across nations 
(Iliev and Roth, 2018). 
The majority of prior studies refer to both agency theory and signalling theory 
to highlight the importance of board diversity and its potential impact on firm 
value, disclosure levels and corporate governance behaviour. According to the 
agency model, the inclusion of foreign board members may improve the board’s 
independence and efficiency. Independent boards are cognisant of their fiduciary 
duty to shareholders and therefore, endeavour to ensure corporate transparency 
and prevent opportunistic or self-serving behaviour by management, which results 
in better online disclosure practices (Armstrong et al., 2010). From the signalling 
theory perspective, firms with a high percentage of foreign board members are 
keen to signal their positive performance to shareholders by voluntarily disclosing 
sufficient information online. This theory also refers to the special knowledge, 
skills and experience foreign directors bring to the table. 
In addition, we use a new modified scoring system to measure online disclosure 
levels by securing more detailed information regarding each of the items in the 
voluntary disclosure index. We argue that increasing the boardroom’s 
internationalisation improves the effectiveness of the board and the standard of 
information disclosed to the public, which in turn reduces the agency costs 
postulated by the agency model. 
This research contributes to the body of literature on nationality diversity of the 
board and corporate online disclosure in several respects. Firstly, our study adds 
an international dimension to the existing literature. In particular, we assert that 
increasing international diversity on the board can improve information disclosure 
and thus reduce agency costs and information asymmetry. As such, this study is 
part of an emerging body of research focusing on the broader effects of 
boardroom internationalisation. Secondly, most recent empirical studies have 
assessed international diversity on the board using the traditional measurements 
associated with studying foreign diversity, i.e. the percentage of foreign board 
members on the board and/or a dummy variable signifying the presence of at least 
one foreign director in the boardroom (Masulis et al., 2012; Marinova et al., 2016; 
Saada, 2018). However, these measurements did not take the homogeneity of the 
board into account. A board can be composed entirely of foreign members. Hence, 
the Blau and Shannon Indexes are used to measure the variety and balance of the 
board in this research. 
   The rest of this article is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a review of 
previous literature and presents the hypotheses of the study; Section 3 outlines 
the methodology, data 
collection procedures, variables of study and the construction of a disclosure 
index; Section 4 presents the findings of the analysis; and Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
2. Related literature and hypothesis development 
The influence of different factors on the online disclosure level has been 
examined in prior literature. These factors are divided into two main groups. The 
first of these is firm specific characteristics, such as size of the firm, profitability, 
leverage, liquidity, industry type, auditor size, firm age and foreign listing 
(Oyelere et al., 2003; Abdelsalam and Street, 2007; Aly et al., 2010; Aqel, 2014; 
Basuony and Mohamed, 2014). The second group is related to corporate 
governance concept, such as board size, non-executive directors, CEO duality, 
family members on the board and ownership (Oyelere et al., 2003; Abdelsalam 
et al., 2007; Abdelsalam and El-Masry, 2008; Waweru, et al., 2019). Therefore, 
the weakness of the previous empirical studies has been the neglect of factors 
related to the personal characteristics of directors as potential determinants for 
online disclosure. It is worth noting that calls have been made for researchers to 
investigate the corporate governance concept, which has become an 
increasingly significant issue. 
Board diversity can be defined as the variety of director characteristics present 
in a given board’s composition (Saggar and Singh, 2017). Within this broad 
definition, the more specific foreign diversity issue has generated an especially 
high level of debate with regard to its influence on boardroom dynamics and 
broader corporate impact. The corporate board influences wide-ranging factors 
including the operating and investment decisions of management and the 
quantity and quality of information disclosed to the public, which in turn, 
influences the level of information asymmetry faced by the external market. 
Abdullah et al. (2016) state that appointing foreign members to the board can 
convey a good impression to investors with respect to the quality of a firm’s 
corporate governance practices. Ujunwa (2012), for example, concludes that 
nationality diversity on the board has a positive impact on firm performance, and 
Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) observe that higher firm values are correlated with 
a higher proportion of foreign board members. Moreover, related studies by Du 
et al. (2017) find that foreign presence on the board can help mitigate earnings 
management practices and enhance earnings’ quality. Although two further 
studies by Ibrahim and Hanefah (2016) and Khan (2010) reveal a positive 
relationship between international presence on the board and corporate social 
reporting (CSR). Furthermore, Zaid et al. (2020) analyse the impact of board 
diversity on the extent of corporate sustainability performance in Palestine using 
the Blau Index and the Shannon Index. They find that there is an insignificant 
positive impact of both nationality and gender diversity on corporate 
sustainability performance. 
Other studies, however, fail to establish support for the notion that foreign 
board members perform their duties more effectively than their domestic 
colleagues. According to Barako and Brown (2008), international presence on the 
board has no significant correlation with CSR disclosure. Barako and Brown 
(2008) also argue that foreign board members most likely act in the interest of 
foreign shareholders and that their presence on the board may thus provide 
these owners with an alternative means of accessing information outside of 
standard disclosure practices. However, it may also be the case that foreign 
board members are less effective in the monitoring role than domestic board 
members, thus reducing the board’s overall effectiveness in performing its 
disciplinary function (Masulis et al., 2012). 
In addition, several studies analyse the impact of gender diversity on 
disclosure. For example, Zahid et al. (2020) examine the impact of boardroom 
gender diversity on corporate sustainability disclosure in Malaysia and find that 
women directors have a significant positive impact on corporate sustainability 
disclosures. Tingbani et al. (2020) investigate the 
ongoing debate regarding women’s role in the boardroom by analysing the 
influence of gender diversity on voluntary disclosure and find a significant positive 
impact of gender diversity on voluntary disclosure. Moreover, Liao et al. (2015) 
argue that a board with more gender diversity has higher voluntary disclosure of 
greenhouse gas emissions in the UK. Furthermore, Nalikka (2009) confirms that 
firms with female chief financial officers are associated with higher voluntary 
disclosure. Although Cabeza-García et al. (2018) use a probit model for Spanish 
firms and find that a higher percentage of women in boardrooms implies better 
CSR disclosure. These studies, however, did not examine the impact of boardroom 
internalisation. 
The previous literature on boardroom diversity is descriptive in nature and 
makes little explicit reference to theoretical models. Several theoretical 
approaches from various academic fields can be used to explain the potential 
impact of international diversity on a firm’s information environment and 
disclosure decisions. In the present study, we focus on agency theory and signalling 
theory. 
According to the agency model, foreign board members play a role in the 
effective monitoring of management insofar as that they are able to exploit their 
position as representatives of international shareholders to prevent self-
interested managerial behaviour. They can bring a high degree of insight and 
improved monitoring capacity to the boardroom, and they may be highly active 
board members who are more inclined to ask the types of questions typically 
avoided by domestic board members.  
Therefore, the presence of foreign board members can enhance the board’s 
independence and efficiency. Independent boards are motivated by their fiduciary 
duty to shareholders and thus take action to promote corporate transparency and 
curb opportunistic or self-serving behaviour on the part of management, which 
results in improved online disclosure practices (Armstrong et al., 2010). In other 
words, a higher proportion of foreign board members may help to improve the 
transparency and information disclosure practices of a firm. 
From the perspective of signalling theory, firms with a high proportion of foreign 
directors will be eager to signal their positive performance to stakeholders by 
voluntarily disclosing ample information online. This theory also refers to the 
distinct knowledge, skills and experience brought to the board by foreign directors. 
Similarly, stakeholder theory assumes that international directors will positively 
affect boards and improve the level of voluntary online information disclosure, 
based on the fact that foreign directors bring important social capital to a firm in 
the form of critical international connections. 
Based on the predictions of the theories discussed previously, this paper argues 
that the presence of international board members will improve the level of online 
disclosure. Whereby increasing the existence of foreign board members enhances 
the transparency and information disclosure practices of a firm. Therefore, the 
hypothesis of this study is as follows: 
H1. There is a positive relationship between foreign board members and 
the level of online disclosure. 
3. Data and methodology 
To explore the impact of boardroom internationalisation on the online disclosure 
practices of nonfinancial USA firms listed on the S&P500, we draw data from 
several sources, including Compustat, BoardEx and the Financial Ratios Suite by 
WRDS. Our sample is constructed using annual data for the year 2019. We first use 
Compustat to create a list of all non-financial firms listed on the S&P500 that had 
non-negative total assets for the year in question. Compustat also provided our 
accounting data for these firms and this was then 
matched with data from the Financial Ratios Suite by WRDS to compute variables, 
such as ROA. The data was also matched with corporate governance data (e.g. 
board size and director nationalities) from the BoardEx database. 
This research contributes to the literature on international diversity and online 
disclosure practices, specifically with respect to firms listed on the S&P500 index, 
whose 500 indexed firms cover approximately 80% of available market 
capitalisation. The index boasts over US$9.9tn, either indexed or benchmarked to 
the index, with indexed assets comprising approximately US$3.4tn of this total. 
The S&P500 is therefore commonly regarded as the most important index for 
large-cap US equities. 
Following prior research (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Adznan and Nelson, 2014; 
Hassanein and Hussainey, 2015; Nelson, 2016), we exclude financial firms from 
the sample because they are subject to capital requirement regulations, which are 
thought to influence disclosure practices. Moreover, banks and insurance firms 
are subject to different disclosure regulations, and the nature of their transactions 
and asset portfolios differs substantially from those of non-financial firms. Thus, 
our final sample for the study consists of data from 331 non-financial firms, all of 
which are listed on the S&P500 index. 
 
3.1 Measurement of online disclosure using a disclosure index 
To comprehensively assess the level of online disclosure based on the integration 
of the key dimensions used in previous investigations; this study constructs a 
unique compound measurement tool or disclosure index, which includes four key 
components: content (i.e. general, financial, corporate governance and investor 
relationship information), technology, user support and timeliness. The first 
dimension of content measures the availability of corporate information 
alongside the type of information disclosed (i.e. financial versus non-financial). 
The technology dimension assesses whether, and how, firms use more advanced 
tools. The user support component evaluates the firm’s website layout and 
design, and the timeliness dimension refers to the timeline in which the 
information was disclosed, e.g. stock price information and press release 
availability. The final index, as categorised into these four dimensions, includes a 
total of 68 items. 
 
3.1.1 Measurements of the disclosure index. Voluntary disclosure levels can be 
evaluated through either a weighted or an un-weighted approach. As noted 
previously, the majority of earlier empirical studies investigating voluntary online 
disclosure have used the un-weighted approach, with proponents of this method 
noting that it has the advantage of giving equal importance to all information, 
irrespective of the type of user. Ferguson et al.(2002) further stipulate that the 
unweighted approach eliminates the unavoidable bias inherent in examining the 
importance of items disclosed with respect to various user groups (e.g. regulators, 
creditors, investors, etc.). Thus, an unweighted index is most appropriate for 
studying a wide array of user groups. 
Al-Janadi et al. (2012), however, assert that the un-weighted method fails to 
take into account the extent to which each item is disclosed because it uses only 
a dummy variable of 1 or 0. This technique disregards the amount of information 
provided with respect to each item, as well as how the information is presented, 
e.g. in graphs, charts or tables. Furthermore, Coy and Dixon (2004) claim that 
subjectivity is an important element in this type of analysis, which is neglected in 
the use of an un-weighted index. 
Based on these arguments and to overcome this limitation, the current study 
uses a modified scoring system, which extends the measurement to five levels of 
disclosure (0, 1, 2, 3 and 4), in addition to the usual un-weighted approach (using 
only 0 and 1). This new method of measurement allows more detailed 
information to be captured for each item in the voluntary disclosure index. The 
five levels of the extended scoring system are outlined as 
follows: firstly, level A (scored as 4) is given to items that are fully published, 
include both quantitative and qualitative information and are followed by graphs, 
charts or tables. Secondly, level B (scored as 3) is given to the item if it is published 
and provides both quantitative and qualitative information. Thirdly, level C 
(scored as 2) is given to the item if it is published and provides either qualitative 
or quantitative information followed by graphs, charts or tables. Fourthly, level D 
(scored as 1) is given to the item if it is published and provides either qualitative 
information, quantitative information or graphs, charts or tables. Lastly, level E 
(scored as 0) is given to the item if it is not used in any manner. 
3.2 Measures of boardroom internationalisation 
In this study, nationality diversity on the board of directors was quantified in 
several ways. Firstly, we calculated the nationality diversity variable using the 
ratio of number of foreign board members to the total number of directors in 
the boardroom. Secondly, we noted the existence of foreign board members on 
the board using a dummy variable equal to 1 if the board had at least one 
foreign board member and 0 otherwise. Both of these techniques have been 
extensively and traditionally used in previous research on boardroom diversity. 
However, as noted previously, they do not always provide a true measure of 
diversity because a board comprised solely of either domestic or foreign board 
members registers as a homogenous board.  
We therefore use two additional measures of international diversity in the current 
study. The first of these is known as the Blau Index (Blau, 1977), which can be 
considered a measure of “variety” insofar as it assesses whether a board includes 
representatives from both the foreign and domestic categories. It is calculated as: 
 
where Pi represents the proportion of foreign board members in each category 
(i.e. foreign or domestic) and n is the number of categories (i.e. in this case, two). 
The maximum and minimum possible values for this variable are, respectively, 0.5 
(when numbers for foreign and domestic board members are equal) and 0 (when 
only one of the two categories is represented). 
The second of these additional measures is known as the Shannon Index 
(Shannon, 1948), which is considered a measure of “balance”, i.e. it assesses how 
equally the two categories of directors are represented on the boardroom. It is 
calculated as: 
 
where Pi and n are defined as previously in the Blau Index. In this case, the range 
of values falls between 0 (i.e. no nationality diversity) and 0.69 (i.e. when the 
proportions are equal). These last two indexes are considered analogous, though 
the Shannon Index is more sensitive to slight differences in board composition. 
A board is thus considered diverse in terms of nationality when it contains both 
foreign and domestic board members, and a board comprised only of members 
from either one of the two categories would not be considered diverse in this 
regard. The two additional indexes help to expand on these differences. However, 
it should be noted that they both reach their maximum value when the two 
categories are represented equally, i.e. they make no additional allowance for 
boards comprising a majority of foreign board members. 
However, this is not considered to be a significant issue because such high 
concentrations of foreign board members are very rare and the number of foreign 
board members is usually quite low. Nonetheless, for this reason, these indexes 
are included in this study as complements, rather than alternatives, to the 
standard proportion and dummy variable techniques. In other words, they are 
included to improve the robustness of our findings. Moreover, only a small 
number of studies use metrics, such as the Blau Index and Shannon Index, for 
diversity (Ali et al., 2014; Ararat et al., 2015; Talavera et al., 2018; Unite et al., 
2019; Zaid et al., 2020), which are better measures of diversity (Aggarwal et al., 
2019). Therefore, following Aggarwal et al. (2019), Unite et al. (2019) and Zaid, et 




3.3 Model of study 
This article hypothesises that the composition of the board of directors can 
influence a firm’s online disclosure practices. In particular, we argue that board 
composition geared towards the reduction of information asymmetry between 
investors and the management increases the likelihood of firms disclosing more 
information online. Following this general hypothesis, the primary independent 
variable of this study is foreign board members. In addition, although not the 
focus of our study, we attempt to control for several other factors that could also 
explain variation in online disclosure level. These include two corporate 
governance variables: 
(1) the percentage of non-executive directors; and 
(2) board size as the logarithm of the total number of directors. 
Also included are several of the variables commonly controlled for in similar 
studies on online disclosure practices, i.e. firm size, profitability and leverage. 
To evaluate the impact of foreign board members on online disclosure, we use 
a cross-sectional model involving both a baseline (i.e. excluding the key variable 
of nationality diversity) and an extended (i.e. including this key variable) form. 
These two models are written as follows: 
Baseline model: 
 
where the index i denotes a firm, ODi is the online disclosure index score, FSi is 
firm size as measured by the logarithm of total assets, ROAi is profitability as 
measured by return on total assets, LEVi is debt to assets ratio, BSi is board size as 
measured by the logarithm of the total number of directors and NONEXi,t is the 
fraction of non-executive directors as measured by the total number of non-
executive directors divided by board size. 
In the extended model and in accordance with the proposed hypothesis, the 
primary corporate governance independent variable is that of nationality diversity 
on the board of directors (NDi). As explained previously, this study uses four 
measures to assess this variable: the percentage of foreign board members 
divided by total board size; a dummy variable equal to 1 if the board has at least 
one foreign board members and 0 otherwise; the Blau Index to measure “variety”, 
i.e. whether the board includes representatives from both 
foreign and domestic categories; and the Shannon Index to measure “balance”, 
i.e. how equally the two categories of foreign and domestic directors are 
represented on the boardroom. 
4. Empirical results  
 
4.1 Descriptive analysis 
To establish the extent of online disclosure level, the current study has developed 
a unique checklist as a research instrument. Both the total online disclosure score 
and its primary components are assessed using un-weighted disclosure indexes, 
which involves two scales, i.e. 0–1 and 0–4. Hence, it is important to ensure that 
the disclosure index actually measures the online disclosure level and that the 
measurement correctly assesses the “goodness of a measure”. It is possible to 
identify the goodness of a measure by conducting a reliability test for the 
disclosure index. A well-favoured test for the reliability of internal consistency is 
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha, which measures inter-item correlation (Sekaran and 
Bougie, 2003). In this study, the result of Cronbach’s alpha for all internet financial 
reporting (IFR) components is higher than 0.7, indicating that the IFR 
component’s indices are reliable. 
Furthermore, to ascertain the current level of online disclosure for the S&P500 
non-financial firms in our sample, we perform a descriptive analysis. Measuring 
the frequency of online disclosure level and its various components can yield a 
more comprehensive understanding of general disclosure level, and this can 
illuminate which items are most and least readily disclosed online. The aim of this 
section is thus to present a clear descriptive picture of the current online 
disclosure practices of the study’s sample of non-financial S&P500 firms. 
The content dimension of the index includes 37 items, which have been 
classified into the following four groups: general information (7 items), financial 
information (16 items), corporate governance (9 items) and investor relations (5 
items). The results in Table 1 show that the minimum disclosure values for general 
information and investor relations are 0%, indicating that some firms did not 
disclose any information related to these categories on their websites. On the 
contrary, some firms demonstrate high levels of online disclosure in this regard, 
notably Cisco Systems Inc., ebay Inc. and Autodesk Inc. 
 
0–1 General information items  0 100 59 23 
 Financial information items  19 75 50 10 
 Corporate governance items  11 89 55 11 
 Investor relation items  0 100 71 21 
 Technology dimension Customer  33 100 74 13 
 support dimension Timeliness  14 95 72 9 
 dimension Total score 0 100 63 15 
                          
 General information items  29 82 64 7 
0–4 Financial information items  0 79 38 13 
 Corporate governance items  20 70 48 10 
 Investor relation items  3 55 23 8 
 Technology dimension Customer  0 100 82 14 
 support dimension Timeliness  33 100 74 13 
 dimension Total score 14 95 72 9 
 0 100 63 15 
 27 72 57 6 
Table 1. Descriptive analysis of online disclosure for non-financial S&P500 
 
Table 1 reveals a somewhat higher overall level of online disclosure with respect 
to the categories of general information and investor relations compared to the 
corporate governance category, though values for the financial information 
category are lower. In fact, financial information disclosed online was generally 
very low overall, suggesting that non-financial firms listed on the S&P500 need 
to improve in this regard. 
With respect to the dimension of technology, Table 1 shows that the average 
disclosure level is 74%. Furthermore, the minimum value for this variable is 33%, 
whereas the maximum value is 100%, with 31 of the sampled firms achieving the 
maximum score (e.g. Exelon Corp., ebay Inc., Microsoft Corp., Cisco Systems Inc. 
and Costco Wholesale Corp.). This demonstrates that the sampled firms generally 
disclose more information related to technology compared to other content 
dimensions. 
The customer support dimension also exhibit higher general levels of online 
disclosure. It can be seen in Table 1 that the average value for this dimension is 
72%, and all of the sampled firms include at least some information in this regard, 
with the lowest value being 14%. The maximum value for this variable is 95%, 
which Disney (Walt) Company achieved. This indicates that firms in our sample 
generally have a strong interest in customer support. 
Similarly, to the technology and customer support dimensions, the timeliness 
dimension also has a relatively high overall level of disclosure, averaging 63%. 
The minimum value, however, is 0%, whereas two firms (Universal Health Svcs 
Inc. and Huntington Ingalls Ind Inc.) achieved the maximum value of 100%. 
4.2 Correlation and independent samples t-test analysis 
Table 2 presents the results of the independent samples t-test, which aims to 
analyse the mean differences in online disclosure for both the 0–1 and 0–4 scales 
between firms with foreign directors in the boardroom (173 firms) and those 
without (158 firms). The results show that the average for the 0–1 index for firms 
with foreign directors in the boardroom is 65.27% (58.6% for 0–4) compared with 
61.87% (55.91% for 0–4) for firms without foreign directors, indicating a mean 
difference of 3.4% (2.68% for 0–4) and significance at the 1%level. This clearly 
indicates that firms with foreign board members have a higher level of online 
disclosure compared with firms without foreign board members. Table 3 
presents the results of the correlation analysis and these reveal a significant 
positive correlation between online disclosure and international representation 
on the board. This indicates that the sampled firms with higher numbers of non-
American board members tend to disclose more information online than their 





0–1 With 173 65.27% 6.87% 4.384 0.000*** 3.40% 0.78% Without 158 61.87% 
7.23% 
0–4  With 173 58.60% 5.71% 4.2580.000*** 2.68% 0.63% 
 Without 158 55.91% 5.74% 
Notes: Table 2 reports the results of the independent samples t-test used to test 
the mean differences in the level of online disclosure index (0–1 and 0–4) 
between firms that had an international presence on the board and those that 
did not. The symbol ***denotes statistical significance at the level of 1% 
Table 2. Independent sample t-test analysis 
 
 
Notes: Table 3 reports the results of the correlation analysis, assessing the 
correlation between nationality diversity and the level of online disclosure index 
(0–1 and 0–4) for the sampled non-financial S&P500 firms. The following 
abbreviations are used in the table. BS = board size, NONEXC = percentage of 
non-executive directors, FS = size of the firm, LEV = leverage, ROA = return on 
              
  Foreign                  
assets. This study uses four measurements for nationality diversity (ND). These 
are as follows. ND%: percentage of foreign board members divided by board 
size; NDD: a dummy variable equal to 1 if the board includes at least one foreign 
board members and 0 otherwise; Blau: the Blau Index measuring “variety”, i.e. 
whether boards include representatives of both foreign and domestic 
categories; and Shannon: the Shannon Index measuring “balance”, i.e. how 
equally foreign and domestic directors are represented on the board. The 
symbols ***; **; and *denote statistical significance at the levels of 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
 
Table 3. Correlation analysis 
4.3 Regression analysis 
The variance inflation factor (VIF) is commonly used to check if there is any 
strong correlation between the explanatory variables. The result of VIF for all 
our variables is less than 1.5, suggesting the absence of multicollinearity. 
Moreover, we use White’s test to check for heteroskedasticity and the result[1] 
is significant at 1%, indicating that heteroskedasticity is present in our data. 
Therefore, we use both OLS and heteroskedasticity-corrected models (HCMs). 
 
4.3.1 Baseline model results. As discussed previously, we begin our analysis by 
estimating the baseline model, which excludes the nationality diversity variable 
to assess only the impact of the firmlevel and corporate governance control 
variables. These results are presented below in Table 4. The OLS and 
heteroskedasticity-corrected results for this model are consistent with our 
theoretical predictions, and all coefficients are shown to be highly statistically 
significant. 
The results of the regression analysis for the variable of board size clearly 
indicate a significant positive correlation with online disclosure for both the 0–1 
and 0–4 scales. The results are also significant at the 1% level for all models except 
the first model, which remains significant at the 5% level. Based on this finding, it 
can be said that increasing board size will improve online disclosure levels. 
However, it should be noted that increasing board size may also result in an 
increase in representation by non-executive directors, which can also improve 
corporate information disclosure. This suggests that firms with larger boards tend 
to disclose more information on the firm’s website. According to agency theory, 
a greater number of board members improves monitoring and enhances 
transparency, with large boards being less vulnerable to dominance by 
management (Hashim, et al., 2014). Therefore, Felo (2010) claims that firms with 
small boards disclose less information than those with larger boards. Having more 
directors on the board can lead to greater diversity of director expertise, for 
example, in relation to financial reporting. Moreover, larger boards tend to 
represent the interests of a range of stakeholders regarding experience and 
opinion. 
 
Table 4. Regression analysis for baseline model 
 
DV 
N = 331 OLS OLS HCM HCM 
R2 0.181 0.15006 0.1864 0.16222 
Adj. R2 0.166 0.13432 0.17133 0.14671 


























































Notes: Table 4 reports the results of the regression analysis for the baseline 
model, which excludes the nationality diversity variable, to analyse the impact 
of the control variables on the level of online disclosure index (0–1 and 0–4) for 
the sampled non-financial0.050 (0.238) S&P500 firms, using0.030 both(0.389) OLS and 
heteroskedasticity-corrected0.044 (0.266) estimates.0.033 (0.298) The abbreviations 
used in the table are as follows. BS = board size, NONEXC = percentage of non-
executive directors, FS = size of the firm, LEV = leverage, ROA = return on assets, 
gender ration = percentage of female directors to the board size; p values shown 
in parentheses 
 
Additionally, improving a firm’s monitoring ability is likely to ameliorate an 
organization’s disclosure policy. Agency theory explains this result by stipulating 
that firms with larger boards may use online disclosure as a means of 
legitimising themselves to the external market. Furthermore, our results are 
consistent with several recent empirical studies, for example, Ezat and El-Masry, 
(2008), Hashim, et al. (2014), Sandhu and Singh (2019), Husted and de Sousa-
Filho (2019), which claim that board size correlates positively with disclosure 
level. 
 
With respect to the second corporate governance control variable, i.e. ratio of 
board size to nonexecutive directors, the results of the regression analysis reveal 
a significant positive correlation with the level of online disclosure for both the 
0–1 and 0–4 scales, as well as for both the OLS and HCMs, with results significant 
at a level of 5%. Agency theory stipulates that with respect to the monitoring 
function of the board, non-executive directors tend to be more credible than 
directors who also hold executive positions within the firm because such 
directors have no self-interest in the firm and will thus be more likely to act solely 
in the interests of shareholders. Non-executive directors are thus important as 
supervising mediators who can reduce the level of conflict between 
shareholders and corporate insiders. They can also help improve matters of 
transparency and disclosure, thus reducing information asymmetry and 
increasing the board’s integrity and capacity to avoid conflicts of interest. For 
this reason, a high ratio of non-executive directors on the board is generally 
thought to be a sign of good governance, which is likely to correspond with high 
levels of transparency and, hence, as in the case of this study, online disclosure 
practice. Thus, a large number of non-executive directors on a firm’s board can 
signify quality corporate governance and normally, a high level of transparency 
(Crowther and Jatana, 2007). In a similar vein, Weir and Laing (2003) and Chau 
and Leung (2006) argue that a large number of outside directors improve the 
monitoring capacity of the board because they are not associated with the firm 
as officers or employees and can therefore act independently in relation to 
shareholders’ interests. We also used gender diversity as another control 
variable, which we measured by calculating the percentage of female directors 
on the board, as well as based on the number of board meetings. However, the 
results show that the impact of these control variables on online disclosure is 
insignificant. 
The results of the regression with respect to the firm-level control variable of 
firm size reveal a significant positive correlation with the level of online disclosure. 
In the existing literature, a near consensus exists regarding the relationship 
between firm size and corporate information transparency, which is that small 
firms are less likely to release adequate financial information. There are three 
potential reasons for this: 
(1) the high costs associated with gathering such information; 
(2) a lack of manager awareness regarding the benefits of information 
disclosure; and (3) the assumption that increasing disclosure might 
undermine their performance and competitive advantage within the 
market. 
Similarly, it is thought that large firms are more likely to engage in ample 
information disclosure for several reasons. First of all, because agency costs are 
thought to be higher for larger firms, managers of large firms may be more likely 
to use disclosure as a means to reduce such costs. Secondly, large firms tend to 
receive more media attention, which creates a need to justify the firm’s existence. 
Thirdly, large organisations tend to be viewed as economically significant by 
various groups of actual and potential stakeholders and are thus subject to 
greater scrutiny by analysts, which in turn, creates added pressure around 
releasing more information, both electronically and through other means. 
Fourthly, large firms tend to have greater access to the capital and expertise 
necessary to produce more information on their activities and the implications of 
these activities. Finally, large firms that wish to continue growing require external 
capital to do so, and such capital is much more obtainable when potential 
stakeholders have access to high quality information about the firm. 
The results of the regression, with respect to the firm-level control variable of 
profitability, reveal a significant positive correlation with the level of online 
disclosure for both the 0–1 and 0–4 scales, as well as for both the OLS and HCMs, 
with all results significant at a level of 1%. This indicates that more profitable firms 
tend to disclose more information via the website than less profitable ones. It is 
thought that profitability acts as a motive for online information disclosure in 
several ways. From the perspective of the signalling model, more successful firms 
have an incentive to distinguish themselves from their less successful 
counterparts to reduce the cost of capital. Furthermore, using a corporate 
website to communicate with the external market can be viewed as a way to 
signal the high quality of a firm’s management. This means that managers may 
see improving the level of online disclosure as a  
way to boast about the firm’s uniqueness compared to its competitors. 
Profitability is naturally considered an indicator of high-quality management and 
investment potential, so it makes sense that profitable firms wish to share such 
information. Moreover, signalling theory can be applied to online reporting 
practices because such information disclosure is voluntary. The argument is that 
profitability spurs management to disclose more information as a means of 
inspiring investor confidence, which in turn can increase manager compensation. 
Similarly, it has been found that highly profitable firms also tend to have greater 
levels of information disclosure in their annual reports. 
The term “leverage” refers to a firm’s use of financial resources, such as debt 
or equity, to increase shareholder returns. As with the findings for the profitability 
variable, the regression results for leverage indicate a significant positive 
correlation with the level of online disclosure for both the 0–1 and 0–4 scales, as 
well as for both the OLS and HCMs, 
with all the results significant at a level of 1%. This means that firms with higher 
levels of debt tend to disclose more information via the website. 
 
4.3.2 Extended model results. We can now move on to a discussion of the 
findings regarding the hypothesis of our study. As noted previously, this 
involves extending the baseline model by adding the key variable of proportion 
of foreign board members to the corporate governance and firm-level control 
variables already examined to uncover any potential correlations with the level 
of online disclosure practices. Estimations are calculated using both the OLS 
(Table 5) and HCMs (Table 6), and the findings are in line with theoretical 
predictions, with all coefficients demonstrating high statistical significance. 
Moreover, a measure of the percentage of foreign directors on the board 
wrongly assigns foreign diversity value to firms with a board comprising more 
than 50% foreigners. This is due to boards with a larger number of foreign 
members being less diverse than boards with an equal number of foreign and 
domestic members. Very few studies have used metrics, such as the Blau Index 
and Shannon Index for diversity (Ali et al., 2014; Ararat et al., 2015; Talavera et 
al., 2018; Unite et al., 2019; Zaid et al., 2020), which are superior measures of 
diversity (Aggarwal et al., 2019). Therefore, following Aggarwal et al. (2019), 
Unite et al.(2019), Zaid et al. (2020), the percentage of foreign directors 
(Models 1–2), a dummy variable equals to 1 if the board has at least one foreign 
board members and 0 otherwise (Models 3–4), the Blau Index (Models 5–6) and 
the Shannon Index (Models 7–8) were used in this study (Tables 4 and 5). The 
Blau Index and the Shannon Index more accurately specify the level of 
international diversity on the board. More specifically, the former is a measure 
of “variety”, assessing whether a board includes representatives from both a 
“foreign” and a “domestic” category, and the latter is a measure of “balance”, 
assessing how evenly foreign and domestic board members are represented on 
a board. 
The percentage of foreign directors revealed nationality diversity as a 
percentage of the board size; however, as noted previously, this does not 
necessarily provide a true measure of diversity because a board comprised 
solely of either domestic or foreign board members is deemed to be a  
homogenous board. Regardless of the proxy of nationality diversity, the 
regression results reveal that nationality diversity amongst board directors 
demonstrated a significant positive correlation with the level of online 
disclosure for both the 0–1 and 0–4 scales as well as for both the OLS (Table  
4) and HCM (Table 5), with all results significant at a level of 1%. This implies 
that the presence of foreign directors on the board for the sampled firms 
enhanced the level of online disclosure. In this regard, the implication of the 
results is that higher numbers of international directors seem to increase the 
likelihood of website use for disclosing information based on its efficiency and 
global accessibility. 
This may be related to the notion that international board members bring unique 
skills and knowledge to the boardroom which can improve transparency and, 
correspondingly, the levels of online information disclosure. Moreover, foreign 
board members tend to have a unique understanding and superior knowledge of 
the external markets that the firm is present in. Such knowledge may add value 
to any future expansion of the firm (Dewayanto, et al., 2017). In addition, it has 
been shown that foreign directors can enhance the board’s independence (Carter 
et al., 2003). Boards with international membership may be considered to be an 
effective mechanism for transferring governance across countries. Therefore, this 
may lead to an increase in the level of online disclosure. Signalling theory likewise 
predicts that firms with greater numbers of foreign directors will want to signal 
their positive performance to the market by voluntarily sharing more information 
via the website. Foreign representation on the board may also improve corporate 
performance based on these directors’ unique knowledge, skills and experience. 
Stakeholder theory also predicts that foreign board members will lead firms 
towards higher levels of voluntary disclosure levels of voluntary disclosure based 
on the social capital they bring to the table in terms of international connections. 
All of these theories support our hypothesis that a positive correlation exists 
between a foreign presence on the board and the level of online disclosure for 




                              




Table 6. Regression analysis for extended model  
 
 
To account for potential heteroskedasticity in the error term in our analysis, we 
estimate the coefficients tstatistics with heteroskedasticity-consistent errors 
(Table 5), clustered by firm (Petersen, 2009). Furthermore, and as discussed 
previously, to quantify the variable of boardroom internationalisation, we use 
new measures, i.e. the Blau Index, to assess variety, and the Shannon Index to 
assess balance. The results for these measures remain qualitatively similar, with 
the hypothesis of the study confirmed with respect to the inclusion of both firm-
level and corporate governance control variables in the models. The results 
confirm that international board members are likely to broaden the range of 
knowledge and experience available to the board, thus improving board 
effectiveness and increasing the overall quality of corporate governance. In 
addition, international board members may have increased capacity to 
coordinate a firm’s resources compared to less diverse boards given the increased 
experience and exposure to global markets of foreign directors in the boardroom. 
5. Conclusion 
This research investigated the relationship between boardroom 
internationalisation and the level of online disclosure for a sample of non-financial 
US firms listed on the S&P500 index. Our study contributes to the existing 
literature on online disclosure by introducing a new variable (i.e. boardroom 
internationalisation). 
The results of the regression analysis support the hypothesis of our study, i.e. 
that international representation on the board enhances online disclosure levels 
for the sample of non-financial S&P500 firms. This implies that firms with a higher 
proportion of foreign board members are more likely to have a higher level of 
online disclosure. This may relate to the unique skills, knowledge and experience 
of foreign board members, which they are able to bring to the boardroom and 
which may have a positive impact on levels of online disclosure. Moreover, the 
results indicate that firm size, profitability, leverage, board size and non-executive 
directors enhance online disclosure levels. 
Our findings provide evidence for policymakers that boardroom 
internationalisation enhances online disclosure and thus, the transparency of the 
firm. The findings can be used, also, by corporate governance institutions to raise 
awareness of the advantages of having foreign members on the board. The study 
will be of value to academic researchers in the field of corporate governance, 
internet reporting and disclosure, as well as to users of online reporting for 
decision-making. We focus only on S&P 500. However, we believe that the same 
hypotheses are worth testing in other countries. Moreover, cross-country 
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